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1. INTRODUCTION 
Advances in medical technology and discoveries in
 
pharmacology have made it possible for doc
tors to save 
and/or sustain the life of individuals who 
decades ago 
would have died. But these developments have 
proved to be 
mixed blessings. A painful terminal illness or a 
life severely 
compromised through handicap are viewed by m
any as fates 
worse than death, especially when suffering 
is prolonged by treatment that can be no
 more than 
palliative. In such cases the question arises
 should the 
doctor employ the techniques and drugs at his
 disposal or 
should he treat selectively? 
In most instances this question is resolvable by 
ascertaining 
the wishes of the patient. Adults, within ce
rtain limits, 
may decline such treatment and allow nature 
to take its 
course, resulting inevitably in an earlier death. 
Sedatives 
and analgesics may be used to alleviate pai
n and it is 
accepted that their use may hasten death. This 
practice has 
come to be known as "passive" euthanasia and 
is acceptable 
to most doctors although some regard it as be
ing contrary 
to Section 164 of the Crimes Act 1961. This sec
tion provides 
that any person who by any act or omission
 causes the 
death of another kills that person although t
he result of 
the act or omission was merely to hasten death. 
"Active" euthanasia, the intentional killing of a
 person who 
suffers in the same way, even by request an
d to relieve 
suffering, is forbidden at law and may amount 
to murder or 
manslaughter. In practice the distinction between 
active and 
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passive euthanasia becomes blurred and it is often argued 
that there is no moral difference between "killing" and 
"letting die". 
S:)ccial problems are posed however by those newborn infants 
who are born with severe defects. They may suffer from 
paralysis, physical deformity, mental retardation, spastici ty, 
bladder and bowel incontinence and numerous other 
conditions. Many of these conditions are by no means rare. 
For example, spin a bifida occurs in between one and ten 
per 1000 births. 1 This results from a failure of the spine to 
fuse properly and infants with spina bifida are almost 
always paralysed to some degree, generally below the waist. 
Mental retardation, owing to hydrocephaly, is also a common 
defect in spina bifida infants as are incontinence and 
infections of the bladder, urinary tract and kidneys. This 
condition cannot be cured by surgery or drugs but in many 
cases can be mitigated by early and vigorous medical 
treatment. 
Down's Syndrome is another frequent cause of mental 
retardation occurring in about one in every 600 births. 2 
Anencephaly, a condition in which the brain is partially or 
wholly absent, occurs in about one per 1000 births. 3 Tay 
Sachs disease, which leads to progressive spasticity and 
dementia, and Lesch Ny ham disease, which results in mental 
retardation and self-mutilation, are less frequent. 4 Overall 
the frequency of major malformations manifested at birth 
including still births - is a bout fifteen per 1000 births. S 
Among doctors and others concerned with these problems 
there is a growing consensus that parents and doctors are 
3, 
morally justified in selecting certain infants for non-treatment 
and early death. They cite the physical and social pain 
and suffering the infant will experience in later years; the 
financial and social costs to the family of having to care 
for a defective child; and the great drain on resources 
involved in maintaining the infant's marginal existence. 
On the other hand, it is easy to feel (at least) doubtful 
about the moral permissibility of allowing an innocent baby 
to die or taking its life, even 
is little prospect of the infant 
when it is clear that there 
leading a meaningful life 
and despite the fact that the net effects on others appear to 
favour death. 
The practice of withholding treatment from severely defective 
infants is a matter of medical reality in this country. The 
parents and doctors involved in these decisions have thus 
far largely ignored the law primarily because no doctor or 
parent has yet been prosecuted for withholding care from a 
defective newborn. Nevertheless under traditional principles 
of criminal law they are committing crimes that may include 
murder, manslaughter, child abuse, negligect or conspiracy 
when they withhold ordinary medical care which leads to 
the injury or death of a newborn infant. 
The discussion which follows will consider both the moral 
and ethical issues raised by the question of whether it is 
permissible to withhold medical care from an infant in any 
circumstances, and the application of the relevant law. In 
particular whether the doctors involved in a decision not to 
4. 
treat are acting in contravention of 
and whether they may be tortiously 
It will also discuss whether New 
t1.t Crimes Act 1961 
liable for damages. 
Zealand law should 
be brought into step with current understanding of the 
ethics of the matter. 
s. 
2. THE MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
"As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there 
be a law that no deformed child shall be reared •.• " 
6 
Aristotle "Politics" Vll, 15. 
The concept of euthanasia is derived from ancient times 
when mercy killing was advocated on a compulsory basis on 
eugenic or utilitarian grounds. Disposal of defective children 
took place in Greece and Rome, and was advocated by such 
philosophers as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. 7 According to 
Safron, an historian of Rutgers Medical School, the 
preponderance of Greek and Roman thoughts made man the 
master of his own body, with the right to decide his own 
8 
fate. However the overwhelming weight of Christian tradition 
and teaching condemns euthanasia. The Roman Catholic 
Church, in particular, proclaim the belief that God alone 
should determine how much suffering each person should have. 
Nevertheless legalising euthanasia was discussed thoughout 
the nineteenth century, although the project made little 
headway. In 1901 Dr Charles Goddard, a prominent British 
physician, advocated euthanasia for "those who, [have] no 
will power nor intelligence of their own, and [are] a 
burden to themselves and especially to their friends and 
society, [and] of course, absolutely incapable of 
improvement". 9 In the 1930's Dr C.K. Millard made it a 
public issue by challenging the traditional belief that 
doctors are bound by the Hippocratic Oath to save life at 
any cost, and stated that though life is sacred "it is not 
something to be selfishly clung to after it has permanently 
ceased to be useful, and especially if we have become a 
burden to others". lO 
6. 
In July 1937, Fortune Magazine reported a survey it had 
made of public opinion regarding mercy killing. In answer 
to the question: 
'Some people believe that doctors should be permitted 
to perform mercy killings upon infants born permanently 
deformed or mentally handicapped. Under what 
circumstances would you approve this?', 
45 per cent approved of euthanasia, administered with 
the permission of the parents and/or a medical 11 board. 
The debate over this issue has continued to rage in varying 
degrees up to the present day. The crucial question is 
in what circumstances, if any, can a defective infant 
be killed or allowed to die? Public opinion has nearly 
always been on the side of those who end needless suffering. 
For example, in 1962 the famous case of a thalidomide 
baby in Belgium, Madam.e Van de Put testified about 
having killed her eight day old infant. "I just thought 
you could not let a baby like that live." Public opinion 
was such that when she was pronounced not guilty, wild 
applause broke out in the courtroom. 12 
Practice reflects that opinion. A survey conducted of 
457 doctors in the United States in 1975 concluded that 
in practice, physicians need not attempt to maintain the 
life of every severely impaired newborn infant, simply 
because they have the technology to do 13 so. In response 
to the question: "Do you believe that the life of each 
and every newborn infant should be saved if it is within 
our ability to do so?", 83 per cent answered "No". 14 
7. 
But is withholding treatment or killing such an infant a 
morally justifiable course of action? Few people would argue 
that all infants with birth defects should be subject to 
euthanasia. In most cases, for example, Down's Syndrome, 
the infant would, under traditional notions of equal respect 
for persons, have a moral right to be treated. It does not 
follow, however, that all critically ill or severely 
handicapped infants should be maximally treated in all 
cases. For the purpose of this paper it is useful to adopt 
Eckstein' s division of defective infants into four groups: 15 
1. Infants with abnormalities which are incompatible 
2. 
with life if untreated, and total recovery and a 
normal child can be expected after surgical treatment. 
Such infants are treated energetically at all times 
and present no moral or ethical problems. 
Infants with severe abnormalities which are 
incompatible with life even with present day treatment. 
Again no moral or ethical problems arise. Medical 
treatment is uniformly withheld from such infants 
because it is futile. 
3. Infants with abnormalities from which they would die 
if untreated but where surgical treatment will 
preserve life but the child will never be normal. For 
example, duodenal atresia when associated with 
Down's Syndrome. 
4. Infants with congenital abnormalities which are likely 
but by no means certain to be fatal and who if 
untreated may survive with more severe handicap 
then if untreated. This group fundamentally embraces 
the whole problem of spina bifida and along with 
group 3 presents enormous moral and ethical 
complications. 
8. 
In Eckstein' s opinion it is quite impossible to kill such 
infants, but if surgical treatment is withheld he believes 
it is only reasonable to withhold other forms of treatment 
such as antibiotics, oxygen and tube feeding. 
16 
But is there any real difference between killing an infant 
and withholding treatment in the knowledge that it will 
certainly die? 
A. To Kill or Let Die? 
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia 
is thought to be crucial for medical ethics. The 
doctrine accepted by most doctors is that in some 
circumstances it is permissible to withhold treatment 
and allow a patient to die, but it is never permissible 
to take direct action designed to kill a patient. 
This ethic has been endorsed by the American 
Medical Association in a statement made in December 
1973: 17 
"The intentional termination of the life of one 
human being by another mercy killing 
is contrary to that for which the medical 
profession stands and is contrary to the policy 
of the American Medical Association. The cessation 
of the employment of extraordinary means to 
prolong the life of the body when there is 
irrefutable evidence that biological death is 
iminent is the decision of the patient and/or 
his immediate family." 
Assuming that in some circumstances it is permissible 
to withhold treatment from a defective newborn 
in the hope or expectation that it wi 11 die shortly, 
many would argue that it is more humane to kill 
9. 
the infant and that in reality this is not morally 
worse than allowing it to die. 
James Rachels gives the example that if someone 
saw a child drowning in a bath it would seem 
just as bad to let it drown as to push its head 
under water. 
18 
It is true that in those circumstances 
the act is as iniquitous as the omission and the 
active/passive distinction may be morally irrelevant. 
But it does not follow that it is always morally 
. l t 19 1rre evan . The example given by Rachels is 
not analagous to euthanasia cases. 
One important difference arising in the euthanasia 
context rests in our judgement of medical fallibility 
and moral responsibility. Discussing the celebrated 
20 
Quinlan case Beauchamp states: 
"To bring about her death is by that act to 
pre-empt the possibility of life. To allow her 
to die by removing artificial equipment is to 
allow for the possibility of wrong diagnosis 
or incorrect prediction and hence to absolve 
oneself of moral responsibility for the taking 
of life under false assumptions. There may, 
of course, be utterly no empirical possibility 
of recovery in some cases since recovery would 
violate a law of nature. However judgments 
of empirical impossibility in medicine are 
notoriously problematic - the reason for emphasizing 
medical fallibility." 
Attractive as this argument is, it is not wholly 
convincing. To kill a patient one must assume 
10. 
causal responsibility for the death. But similarly, if 
treatment is ceased and the patient dies, the patient 
might have recovered if treatment continued. 
Another superficially compelling argument for 
disregarding the distinction is that if a decision not 
to operate is made then a doctor should be able to 
relieve "suffering" by killing the infant who could 
otherwise live for weeks or months waiting to die. 
The following description illustrates what may happen 
after a decision is made not to operate on 
Syndrome infant with an intestinal obstruction 
" ... When surgery is denied [ the doctor] 
to keep the infant from suffering while 
forces sap the baby's life away. As a 
a Down's 
21 
must try 
natural 
surgeon 
whose natural inclination is to use the scalpel to 
fight off death, standing by 
salvageable baby die is the 
exhausting experience I know. 
and watching a 
most emotionally 
It is easy at a 
conference, in a theoretical discussion, to decide 
that such infants should be allowed to die. It is 
altogether different to stand by in the nursery 
and watch as dehydration and infection wither a 
tiny being away over hours and days. This is a 
terrible ordeal for me and the hospital staff 
much more so than for the parents who never set 
foot in the nursery." 
But whose suffering 
death? Certainly not 
is going to be relieved 
the infants. An infant 
by 
is 
11. 
not fully capable of abstraction. It responds only 
to relatively simple stimuli with relatively simple 
internal as well as external behaviour. 
"Quite simply 'waiting to die' is a nonexistent 
thought for an infant. 1122 
As illustrated by the above description the suffering 
to be relieved by death would seem to be that 
of the medical staff and the family. The killing 
of an infant is an 
their suffering. 
unacceptable means of alleviating 
The argument of killing to relieve suffering is 
more compelling when applied to those infants 
in group 4 above. For example studies have suggested 
that ten to sixteen per cent of infants with spina 
bifida who are untreated are alive at one to two 
years so there is a tail-off of 
. 23 survivors. The 
following case report represents the results of 
a survivor of non treatment:
24 
An eight year old boy is in a school for the 
blind and has an IQ of 80. It is difficult for 
him to sit because of the marked paralytic 
kyphosis, which also interferes with the ileal 
stoma so that a collecting device cannot be 
kept in place. His hips have redislocated: 
the hydronephrosis is of moderate degree. 
He was born with spina bifida and his parents 
were told that he would die. Thus he was given 
only routine care. lf he had been actively treated 
from birth, he would still have been paraplegic 
but possibly with a normal IQ and vision, and 
12. 
without hydronephrosis. If the goal of the original 
non-treatment was the death of the child, the child 
should be considered a non-treatment failure. If the 
goal was to end the child's suffering then should 
there have been restrictions on helping the child to 
die quickly? 
Rachels25 further argues that the retention of the 
conventional distinction leads to decisions concerning 
life and death being made on irrelevant grounds. For 
example, a Down's Syndrome infant with an intestinal 
blockage will die without an operation. The operation 
is not difficult but may not be performed because the 
infant has Down's Syndrome. But if one thinks it is 
better not to allow a Down's Syndrome infant to live 
what difference should it make whether its intestinal 
tract is obstructed or not. Or if the life of such an 
infant is worth preserving what does it matter if it 
needs a simple operation? It is the Down's Syndrome, 
and not the state of the intestines, that is in issue. 
However compelling arguments exist for the retention 
of the active/passive distinction. Firsly the so-called 
"wedge" argument. This is if killing was allowed 
even under the guise of mercy a dangerous wedge 
would be introduced placing all "unworthy" human 
life in a precarious . . 26 d position , an our basic 
principles against killing would be gradually eroded. 
Many point out that this is precisely what occurred 
during the Nazi era when euthanasia gradually spread 
13. 
to anyone deemed to be an enemy of the people. An 
SS man stationed in the Wargenthau sent Eichmann a 
memorandum telling him that "Jews in the coming 
Winter could no longer be fed" and submitting for 
his consideration a proposal as to whether "it would 
not be the most humane solution to kill those Jews 
who were incapable of work through some quicker 
means". 27 
Beauchamp co-joins the above wedge argument with 
28 
rule utilitarian arguments, rule utilitarianism being 
the position that a society ought to adopt a rule if 
its acceptance would have better consequences 
for the common good (greater social utility) than any 
comparable rule could have in that society. He looks 
at the question of which of two moral rules, the 
no-active-euthanasia rule or a restricted-
active-euthanasia rule, if enacted would have the 
consequence of maximising social utility? 
A restricted active euthanasia rule would clearly 
have some social utility as it would allow the 
elimination of some 
suffering. However the 
intense and 
dis utility of 
uncontrollable 
introducing 
legitimate killing into the moral code outweighs the 
utility of doing so. It may result in a relaxation on 
rules in the code which demand a respect for human 
life. For example if a restricted euthanasia rule 
were introduced it is plausible that killing defective 
infants might become common practice to relieve the 
burden on their families and society as might the 
14. 
killing of the aged and the anti-social. 
"Rules against killing in a moral code are not 
isolated moral principles; they are pieces of 
a web of rules against killing which forms 
the code. The more threads one removes, the 
weaker the fa bric becomes. 1129 
Nevertheless our society has shown it can withstand 
some exceptions to the moral rules prohibiting 
killing, for example, killing in self-defence and 
in war-time. Why then can it not withstand one 
more exception? The answer is clear. The exception 
of euthanasia is a significantly different situation 
because it would involve the taking of morally 
blameless lives. In the case of aggressors it is 
generally accepted that their actions are blameworthy 
and justify counteraction. 
In conclusion: JO 
" ... as a genera 1 rule, the common good of society 
and the rights of individuals seem best served 
by reluctance to legitimize widespread authority 
to terminate human life. This reluctance grows 
not from a pananoid anticipation of extensive 
infanticide, 
practices 
but 
tend to 
from awareness 
modify and 
that social 
spread. There 
are a variety of life situations where speedy 
death might appear to be a merciful solution 
to real problems, e.g., severe mental deficiency, 
profound emotional disorders, and crippling 
old age. But, in each of these si~uations, the 
active euthanasia solution legitimizes a practice 
B. 
15. 
that is theoretically difficult to contain. Unless 
forms of due process can be devised to contain 
the 
the 
practice 
rights 
and 
all 
give absolute protection to 
of vulnerable, voiceless, and 
"useless" members of society, it seems foolhardy 
and dangerous to urge a policy of active euthanasia 
for dying neonates." 
Quality of Life v Sanctity of Life 
Two fundamental principles governing the atittude 
of doctors to their patients are constantly in conflict. 
First, that a doctor's duty is to relieve suffering, 
even at the risk of causing death, and second, 
that human life itself is sacred and that doctors 
have a duty to prolong life at all costs. A British 
Working Party established 
of selective treatment of 
back in 1975 that: 31 
to consider the 
spina bifida 
ethics 
reported 
" ••. of the two traditional aims of medicine 
the prevention of suffering and the preservation 
of life the former carries the greater weight. 
It is the balance of pain and happiness in 
other words, the utilitarian principle 
holds sway." 
which 
Yet not all doctors would be in agreement with 
the report. In 1981 Dr Bartholome, an American 
d . . . t 32 pe 1a tnc1an wro e: 
"We owe these dying babies our most compassionate 
and caring treatment during their short lives. 
But Duff clearly argues that in addition to 
this category there is a category of infants 
16. 
who should not be treated because they have 
an inadequate quality of life. I would argue 
that this expression is pernicious and dangerous. 
If we are not dedicated, as physicians, to 
the proposition of "equality of life" we risk 
falling into the swamp that enveloped our profession 
in Germany only decades ago. The handicapped 
infant challenges all of us and stretches the 
moral fabric that holds us together as a society. 
Duff would ask that we cut a hole in that 
fabric just large enough to allow a few "defectives" 
to slide through. All who have struggled to 
respond to these children and their families 
can understand this wish. All of us who claim 
to be servants of children must resist the 
temptation." 
The proponents of the sanctity of life principle 
argue that there is an absolute moral duty to 
preserve human life and that this duty supercedes 
any consideration of comfort or even of expected 
outcome for the recipient and that in any event 
no human prognosis is certain. Slogans arise such 
as "There is no such thing as a life not worth 
saving" or "Who is the physician to play God? 1133 
On the other hand Theologian Martin Marty was 
quoted as saying in support of the move to discontinue 
treatment of Karen Quinlan: 34 
"When in any other age [she] would be dead, 
then I believe that it is not playing God to 
17. 
stop extraordinary treatment. In fact, it is 
playing God to keep her alive." 
Most doctors today would accept that their duty 
to preserve life at all costs is only secondary 
to their duty to prevent pain and suffering. Neverthe-
less the British Working Party still believes it 
. . t t t h · th t · · l 35 1s 1mpor an o emp as1se e wo pnnc1p es: 
"To argue solely in terms of general happiness 
provides no safeguard against injustice towards 
individuals. A newborn child with spina bifida 
has little to put in the scales of utilitarian 
balance unless the sheer fact of humanity is 
respected. No doubt in many cases such respect 
for its life will be outweighed by the potential 
misery the child might suffer and cause. But 
unless there is seen to be at stake a conflict 
of principles, not just a single principle, the 
gradual assumption of powers over life and 
death could become too easy." 
C. The Interests of the Infant 
The usual justification for non-treatment of a defective 
infant is that it is in the best interests of the 
child, who faces a painful life of psychosocial 
handicap, and that parents and physicians are 
simply making the choice which the child would 
make in this situation if able to formulate and 
express a preference. But every infant born possesses 
a moral value which entitles it to the medical 
and social care necessary to effect its well-being. 
36 
18. 
It is independently valuable. That is, its fundamental 
work is not a function of how much or little others 
value it. This conception of the independent and 
equal value of human beings is basic in modern 
W t . ·1· t" 37 es ern c1 v1 1sa 10n. Parents bear the principal 
moral responsibility for the well-being of their 
infant yet doctors have a duty to take medical 
measures conducive to the well-being of the infant 
- patient and may at times be duty bound to resist 
a parental decision. 
An approach to selection based on the best interests 
of the infant is preferable to one based on the 
needs of others, for example, the family, but should 
nevertheless be 
difficult 
approached with caution. It is 
extremely to ascertai1: the infants best 
interests. What appears to be a fate worse than 
death to a healthy, normal adult may be tolerable 
or a source of pleasure to one who has never known 
those capacities. 
Even normal, healthy adults cannot come to a 
consensus on what is in the best interests of the 
38 
infant. Slater states: 
"These children are now beginning to come into 
puberty and adolescence, when their sufferings 
will really begin. Only the most miserably 
impaired social life will be open to them; they 
will be equipped with normal sex drive but 
no normal sex function; all around them they 
will see the normal, the vigorous, the healthy. 
Will they really be grateful to the fates, the 
19. 
all too human fates, but for whose intervention 
they would have died before their miseries began?" 
Whereas Zachary who has spent much of his life 
caring for spina bifida children says: 39 
"Some have been regarded as living completely 
miserable and unhappy lives. Yet when I see them 
I find happy young people who can respond to 
concern for their personal welfare." 
Many people believe that attempts to preserve life by 
surgery should be more actively pursued if the 
prospects for the child's intelligence are good. This 
view must arise out of either ( 1) the assumption that 
some aspect of mental function is an essential human 
characteristic and therefore at some degree of mental 
retardation these infants are less than fully human 
or ( 2) the assumption that the suffering of the 
infant will be worse if it is mentally retarded. 
In response to ( 1) I would suggest that it is almost 
impossible to list the characteristics which cause us 
to regard a living being as fully human. Campbell 
states that "in ascribing the status, person, to a 
living organism with humanoid characteristics it is 
its capacity to communicate and be communicated with, 
both at a rational and at an emotional level". 40 By 
this view a child with Down's Syndrome would be 
considered a person and should therefore have the 
right to medical treatment like other infants. However 
the practice of withholding surgery from Down's 
20. 
Syndrome infants indicates that others must place 
more emphasis on rationality and higher functions 
than Campbell. 
If the future suffering of the infant is the main 
justification for non-treatment I would question 
the assumption that severe physical handicap ( life 
in a wheelchair and impotence accompanied by 
normal libido) is more tolerable if the intelligence 
is preserved than if it is not. 
In discussing the fate of a defective infant one 
must always bear in mind that many severely 
handicapped 
lives. Thus 
people lead 
the decision 
worthwhile, fulfilling 
to withhold treatment 
in the best interests of the infant must be approached 
with caution because by 
line between life and death. 
it we are drawing a 
D. The Interests of the Family 
The best interests of the children are almost al ways 
inextricably linked to those of their family and 
often decisions to treat or not to treat an infant 
will involve sacrificing the interest of one for 
another. 
infants 
The burden which survival of defective 
imposes on families may include medical 
and special care expenses, marital disrupt ion, 
depression, neglect of siblings, and other 
manifestations of familial pathology. In particular 
circumstances each of these may appear but their 
frequency is 
preventable.41 
unclear 
More 
and their 
generous 
occurrence perhaps 
public support for 
21. 
such families, including counselling assistance, 
could relieve some of these burdens. It is also 
possible to separate the interests of infants from 
those families by foster homes or institutional 
care although many feel ins titu tiona liza tion is 
a last resort. 
"Even in better institutions where severely defective 
human beings are "warehoused", conditions 
are so unavoidably detrimental to any child's 
interests that it is easy to understand why 
some loving parents either keep their child 
at home despite great burdens or sorrowfully 
choose <lea th for their child ... 1142 
The solution to family stress can never be the 
death of the infant. Consider the hypothetical 
case of a juvenile delinquent who lies in hospital 
requiring life-saving surgery. This child has caused, 
and will continue to cause, a great deal of stress 
to those living around him. The surgery will be 
carried out and the child's life saved, for we 
do not consider death a reasonable solution to 
those who cause excessive stress to other people. 
The danger is that: "There is an infitite number 
of uses for death once its use becomes a legal 
means of solving a human problem. ,,43 
With a sense of balance and tragedy it is only 
;:-ight that 
to benefit 
writes: 44 
the 
the 
family IS 
child. 
interests are sacrificed 
Diamond, a pediatrician, 
22. 
"Some of the phrases used to justify the withholding 
of treatment for defective infants are "siblings 
right to relief", "threats to the marriage bond", 
"fear that other children would be socially 
enslaved and economically deprived", or that 
"parents would be permanently stigmatized in a 
state of chronic sorrow." The use of this language 
suggests that the newborn child does not have 
rights of its own. It suggests that the birth of a 
child is not an end in itself but rather a means 
to an end (which is the fulfillment of parental 
desire). Pediatricians cannot project themselves in 
the role of correcting all the inequities of nature. 
We cannot propose to eliminate all of the social 
and economic impact of a child's illness on a 
family by eliminating the ill child himself. There 
is simply no way in newborn medicine to implement 
the mercantile principle of "satisfaction guaranteed 
or your money back"." 
E. The Interests of Society 
Society has a twofold interest in the decision whether 
to treat a defective infant or not. Firstly an interest 
in the proper fulfillment of responsibilities and duties 
regarding the wellbeing of the infant, that interest 
being the concern of society at large that individuals 
respect certain values and fulfill certain 
responsiblities and duties. 45 Secondly an interest in 
ensuring an equitable apportionment of limited 
23. 
resources among its citizens. 
The justification for non-treatment arising from the 
second interest is that there is a limit to what the 
community can spend on health care, from which it 
follows that resources expended on one medical 
problem reduce the amount available for other medical 
problems. Thus scare resources which could be put to 
better use elsewhere, would be consumed in keeping 
defective newborns alive at state expense. The same 
charge can, of course, be made against all social 
programmes providing services to the disabled, 
elderly, and institutionalised, and it is difficult to 
see defective newborns as a distinct class. 46 
F. Nature's Sounder Judgement 
One further argument must be raised in support of 
allowing defective infants to die. It is that in this 
situation the most reliable guidance available is that 
as the majority of deformed fetuses either abort, are 
stillborn or live only a short time after birth, that 
nature did not intend such babies to be viable. 
"Nature makes few mistakes in her vast "reproduction 
factory". Where she does on occasion fall into 
error, then surely it is better and more humane 
to support rather than strive against her sounder 
judgement". 47 
24. 
In conclusion the only possible moral justification 
for denying an infant medical treatment in the hope 
that it will die is that it is in the best interests of 
the infant that it die soon after birth rather than 
live. The respective interests of family and society 
can only be secondary to those of the infant. To find 
otherwise would be to undermine the basic conception 
of our society that each human being is independent 
and of equal value. Before it is permissible to 
withhold medical treatment is must be ascertained 
beyond reasonable doubt that this course of action is 
in the best interests of the infant, that its life 
would not be worth living and that it would undergo 
significant amounts of suffering if allowed to live. It 
is admitted that in many cases it is difficult to 
predict in the first hours after birth the potential of 
the infant. In such cases I submit we must err on 
the side of caution and actively treat the infant. 
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3. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION 
A policy of selective non-treatment of defective 
infants can only be safely adopted if substantive 
and procedural criteria are developed for non-treatment 
decisions. If they are not, the current haphazard, 
arbitrary selection for non-treatment is likely 
to continue with parents and doctors continuing 
to decide in haste according to their own value 
standards. 48 In New Zealand there are no guidelines 
laid down as to who should make the decision 
and on what grounds. Pediatricians and other 
doctors facing this situation rely on their own 
and moral values, and the criteria experience 
adopted, both substantive and procedural, are 
varied. There is the possibility that some may 
err on the side of under-treatment, thus causing 
the death of infants who have the right to live. 
Substantive criteria for non-treatment are those 
that define a class of infants from whom necessary 
medical treatment may be withheld. In essence, 
the criteria represent a moral judgement that this 
class of infant are not so important that we need 
expend 
alive. 49 
further medical resources 
Procedural criteria on 
on 
the 
keeping 
other 
them 
hand 
specify how to go about deciding whether an infant 
falls within the class from whom treatment can 
be withheld, raising such questions as who shall 
decide and how shall the decision be reached. SO 
Procedural criteria ensure that the substantive 
criteria are applied correctly and thus provide 
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a further protection for the infant. 
A. Substantive Criteria 
Concerning substantive criteria for non-treatment, 
it is interesting to note that recently the courts 
have begun to enunciate and articulate patient-centred 
d · like Q · 1 51 S · k · 52 groun s, 1n cases u1n an, a1 ew1cz, 
and Dinnerstein53 . They focus on the patient's 
needs and interests not on those of doctors, family 
and society, asking such questions as: what is 
the best interest of the patient? What will benefit 
this patient? What would this patient want if he 
was competent to speak? 
This emphasis on patient-oriented criteria is 
reassuring. We are not merely sacrificing patients 
who are powerless to protect themselves in order 
to benefit others. But just asking what is in the 
best interests of the infant is not enough. More 
specific guidelines are needed to enable the decision 
makers, whether they be doctor, parents, hospital 
committee or courts, to be consistent in their practice 
and to safeguard the interests of infants who for 
example might be in the "grey" area but whose 
parents do not wish to be burdened with their 
up bringing. 
Campbell and Duff54 believe that the most important 
medical criterion is the degree of abnormality, 
disease or damage to the central nervous system, 
especially the brain. If there is little or no brain 
function sufficient to allow a personal life of meaning 
and quality and no potential for human relationships 
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non-treatment seems to be indicated. For example, 
nearly all would agree that the anencephalic infant 
is without relational potential. On the other hand, 
the same cannot be said of a Down's Syndrome 
infant. The difficult task arises in the grey area 
between such extremes. 
It is essential I believe that guided by the above 
criterion decisions be made on a case-to-case basis 
rather than attempting to place an infant in a 
diagnostic pigeon-hol 0 • This view was shared by 
a majority of pediatricians and pediatric surgeons 
surveyed in the United States in 1975, 55 The 
decision must be based on the potential for human 
relationships associated with the infant's condition 
and to guide grey area decisions doctors must 
try to identify those biologic conditions that probably 
provide negative indicators. If the doctors 
doubt, 
are 
of the opinion, beyond reasonable that 
the i nfant has little or no such potential then 
non-treatment is indicated. However as McCormick 
. t 56 po1n s out: 
" •.• mistakes will be made. Some infants will 
be judged in all sincerity to be devoid of any 
meaningful relational potential when that is 
actually not quite the case. This risk of error 
should not lead to abandonment of decisions; 
for that is to walk away from the human scene. 
Risk of error means only that we must proceed 
with great humility, caution, and tentativeness. 
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Concretely, it means that if we err as we must 
at times, it is better to err on the side of 
life - and therefore to tilt in that direction". 
B. Procedural Criteria 
Procedural criteria are necessary to ensure that 
the substantive criteria are properly applied to 
individual cases. If none are specified then any 
criteria enunciated for non-treatment may not affect 
the behaviour of doctors and others to any great 
extent. The usual form of rule enforcement, complaint 
by an individual wronged, will not work here, 
and some infants may wrongly be deprived of care 
that they have a right to receive. 
Before discussing who is in the best position and 
who has the right to make the decision to withhold 
treatment we must recognise that no-one can make 
a totally conflict-free decision in this situation. 
Many recognise the conflicts facing parents in 
this situation but the potential for conflict arises 
with other possible decision makers. For example 
hospital committees must be sensitive to the utilitarian 
issue of high costs and low benefits; courts must 
be more concerned about legal doctrine than about 
the interests of a particular child; and doctors 
have a long history of using the sick to learn 
about diseases, to transmit knowledge, and to 
make a living, all being important "latent" functions 
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which often are in competition with the manifest 
function of patient care . 57 
Many believe that parents and doctors should carry 
the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether or 
not to withhold treatment. But can parents make a 
proper decision concerning the non-treatment of their 
own child or do they have so great an interest in 
the outcome and are so emotionally traumatized by 
the birth that they are incapable of acting 
impartially. Fost writes that: 58 
"In the turmoil of the newborn period, parents are 
often ignorant of the facts which are relevant to 
the child's future, and unable to assimilate these 
facts until the initial period of shock has 
subsided, " 
and Sherlock is particularly . 1 59 cyn1ca : 
" ••• this reliance on parental judgement allows for 
the worst and most arbitrary factors to be 
determinative of whether the infant lives or dies. 
For example, it is well established that parental 
religiosity correlates highly with a willingness to 
care for a defective child. Do the authors therefore 
wish us to adopt a policy that allows the child to 
live or die simply as a result of the religious 
convictions of the parents?" 
It is admitted that the birth of an infant with a 
congenital abnormality will cause the parents 
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tremendous emotional upset and that in such a state 
it may be difficult to make coherent rational decisions 
about a dilemma which is completely new to them. 
But I am in agreement with Duff when he writes: 60 
"Being emotionally troubled does not make parents 
unintelligent nor does it prevent them from using 
the intelligence they have. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that parents are 
emotionally upset ( ... ) precisely because they have 
a painfully adequate general understanding of the 
situation. True, parents cannot assimilate and 
understand all the technical data (which even 
experts only partly understand and about which 
they often disagree), but that is not necessary 
for them to make informed judgements about care ••• 
It is only necessary that parents be reasonably 
knowledgeable of the personal and social meaning 
of biologic circumstances to themselves and their 
children in a mora 1 order which they (parents) 
have helped to create and urgently need to 
continue creating in order to adapt". 
In deciding how much weight to give to parental 
preferences it is useful to see on what theory of 
parental authority it is based. In New Zealand it 
would seem that parents act as trustees for their 
children, and their opinion should therefore only be 
relevant insofar as it represents a reasonable proxy 
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for the child IS best interests. This view is reflected 
in child abuse laws 
61 
where the state our may 
intervene when the parents act in a way which 
threatens the child IS healthy upbringing. Thus 
for infants the best course is that the parents 
have primary decisional power although the responsible 
doctor will usually share or assume this in order 
to help the parents with the burden. 
The risk remains that not all parents will always 
act altruistically in caring for their children, 
although this could be minimised if the attending 
doctor reliably reviewed parental decisions. He 
should be more detached than the parents and 
could effectively screen out improper parental decisions 
either through further discussion with the parents, 
reference to a hospital ethics committee or judicial 
intervention. 
If a dispute does arise between the parents and 
their doctor then it should be referred to an impartial 
third party. This third party would ideally be 
comprised of a committee of two medical practitioners, 
a lawyer, and two members of the general public. 
They are likely to give a more detached, careful 
review of the relevant information and would represent 
societal consensus as to the propriety of non-treatment. 
Such a committee would be of particular importance 
in those borderline cases in which the attending 
doctor is uncertain of the prognosis of the infant 
and in doubt whether to treat or not. He could 
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acquire immunity in making a decision if the prognosis 
was first confirmed, for example, by the suggested 
committee. 
An important aspect in the decision making process 
if it were not a clear-cut case would be the need 
for someone to speak for the child, who is, after 
all, the party that stands to lose the most from 
an erroneous decision. A neutral party such as 
a guardian ad litem should always be appointed 
if the decisions of the parents to withhold treatment 
is disputed. 
The courts should only be available as an appeal 
body and thus reference to them would be a last 
resort. 
"Since courts are obliged (rightly) to focus on 
laws applicable to all people and since they 
use an adversary approach to debate ( ... ) ' 
they must be slow to act and rigid. They are 
unlikely to understand the sensitive feelings 
and complex inner values, ( some religious in 
nature) of individual family members and to 
act in harmony with them. Such failure is non-
caring, will stifle creativity, will disrupt 
62 
adaptation, and will foster helplessness." 
Although not in full agreement with the above 
extract it makes the point that the courts are 
not in a position to review the majority of decisions 
that are regularly made not to treat defective 
newborns. Each case will be different and the 
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factors to be taken into consideration will depend 
on the circumstances peculiar to the birth of a 
particular infant. The court cannot review each 
and every one of these decisions, nor would it 
be proper for it to do so. The decision not to 
treat is primarily that of the parents of the infant 
and the attending doctor. The court's role arises 
solely in the context of interpretation of the proposed 
statute and consideration of any other legal issues 
that might arise. 
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4. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
A. Criminal 
The practice of medicine raises peculiar problems 
for the criminal law. An integral part of a doctor's 
job involves decisions that will affect the life 
span of his patient. It is therefore important that 
the law be neither too strict nor too lenient. If 
it is too strict it will make doctors criminally 
responsible for man's mortality; if it is too lenient 
it will give doctors a "licence to kill". 63 
The defective infant, wh-=' is alive and fully separate 
from the mother, is in the eyes of the law a person 
with legal rights, the subject of legal duties, 
and entitled to the full protection of the criminal 
law. 
" ..• at the moment of live birth there does exist 
a human being entitled to the fullest protection 
of the law. The most basic right enjoyed by 
every human being is the right to life itself. 1164 
Causing the death of an infant by intentional 
withholding of food or necessary medical treatment 
by a doctor who has undertaken to treat the infant, 
may constitute a series of crimes ranging from 
murder and manslaughter to conspiracy and breach 
of duty to provide the necessaries of life. 
The existence of potential criminal liability is 
no guarantee that doctors will in fact be prosecuted, 
nor that any prosecution will be successful. No 
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doctor has yet been convicted of murder or 
manslaughter for withholding treatment from a 
defective newborn infant, but this is not a reliable 
guide for the future. As the practice becomes more 
openly acknowledged, pressure may build to prosecute 
and convictions may result . In recent years the 
courts have occasionally reviewed non-treatment 
decisions in cases in which disagreement arose 
between parents and doctor, and the decisions 
have almost uniformly required treatment for the 
infant. 65 
Homicide is defined in Section 158 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 as being "the killing of a human being 
by another, directly or indirectly, by any means 
whatsoever". An infant becomes a human being 
within the meaning of this section when it has 
completely proceeded in a living state from its 
mother's body, whether it has breathed or not, 
whether it has an independent circulation or not, 
d h h h 1 . . d 66 an w et er t e nave string 1s severe or not. 
Homicide is only an offence if it is "culpable1167 , 
and it is culpable when it consists in the killing 
of any person by 
excuse to perform 
an 
or 
omission without lawful 
observe any legal 68 duty. 
The death of the person must take place within 
69 a year and a day after the cause of death. 
36. 
The doctor who withholds life-saving treatment from 
an infant under his care may be in breach of a 
legal duty imposed by Section 151 of the Act and 
thus prima facie guilty of culpable homicide, which 
will amount to murder if his intention was to cause 
the death of the infant. Section 151 imposes a legal 
duty on doctors in favour of their infant patients. It 
reads: 
"Everyone who has charge of any other person 
unable, by reason of age •.. , to withdraw 
himself from such charge, and unable to provide 
himself with the necessaries of life, is ( ... ) 
under a legal duty to supply the person with the 
necessaries of life, and is criminally 
responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to 
perform such duty if the death of that person is 
caused, or if his life is endangered or his health 
permanently injured by such omission." 
If a doctor is in breach of this section and the 
infant dies he is liable on a charge of murder or 
manslaughter. The charge will be murder if the doctor 
"means to cause the death" of the infant killed. 70 
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder is 
1 h 
. 71 mans aug ter. If the infant's life is endangered or 
his health permanently injured by a breach of Section 
151 the doctor would be liable for up to seven years 
. . t 72 1mpnsonmen . 
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To establish the duty it must firstly been shown 
that the doctor has charge of the infant, that 
is, that he has the onus of care for it. It is 
clear that the doctor attending at birth, in accepting 
the task of delivering the infant, also accepts 
the infant as being under his care73 and the doctor 
cannot thus contend 
the 
care 
The 
proper authority 
falls upon them. 74 
second element 
that 
and 
of an 
the parents constitute 
therefore the onus of 
offence under Section 
151 is failure to provide the "necessaries" of life. 
:n the Canadian Court of Appeal decision in R 
v. Lewis 75 , Moss CJO held that what is to be included 
in "necessaries" is to be determined upon the 
circumstances of each case. 76 They without doubt 
include food and clothing, and also medicine and 
medical treatment in cases where ordinary prudent 
persons would obtain them. 77 Thus it would not 
be open to a doctor to maintain as a defence under 
this section that in the case of a Down's Syndrome 
infant with an intestinal blockage, it was impossible 
to nourish the infant because of the blockage. 
In such a case surgery would amount to a necessary 
of life. 
There are several defences which may be raised, 
however, to a charge under this section. The first 
is that the doctor believes that the potential quality 
of life of the infant is such that he ought not 
to provide treatment on moral grounds and thus 
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he has a "lawful excuse 1178 to withhold medical 
care. There is little guidance as to the meaning 
of "lawful excuse" but reference may be made to 
Wong Pooh Yin v. Public Prosecutor79 and the other 
cases cited therein. The following passage from 
that judgement was cited with approval by the 
80: Court of Appeal in Burney 
"There Lordships doubt if it is possible to define 
the expression 'lawful excuse' in a comprehensive 
and satisfactory manner and they do not propose 
to make the attempt. They agree with the Court 
of Appeal that it would be undesirable to do 
so, and that each case requires to be examined 
on its individual facts." 
The withholding of the necessaries of life for quality 
of life reasons has thus far not been considered 
by a court to constitute a "lawful excuse" under 
Section 151 and is not likely to be in the future. 
In R v. Lewis81 the court stated: 
" .•• the law of the land must be obeyed, and 
it must be obeyed even though there be something 
in the shape of belief in the conscience of 
the person which would lead him to obey what 
in his state of mind he may consider a higher 
power or higher authority. 
And especially must there be obedience where 
the subject of the judgement to be exercised 
is a child of tender years unable to exercise 
any judgement of his own. . •. the offender cannot 
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escape punishment because he holds a belief 
which impels him to think that the law which he 
has broken ought not to exist or ought never to 
have been made." 
It is apparent that the court in that case would not 
excuse an offender because he believed that his act 
or omission was morally justifiable. 
A second argument against liability for withholding 
treatment under this section is that the duty owed to 
the infant encompasses only ordinary means of care 
as opposed to extraordinary care. Ordinary measures 
are taken to mean those not causing grave hardship 
to the patient and which offer a reasonable hope of 
success whereas extraordinary measures are those 
involving great expense, inconvenience or hardship 
to the patient and which offer no reasonable 
expectation of success or benefit to the . 83 patient. 
This distinction was expressly recognised in the 
Quinlan case i:-i relation to terminally ill adults. 84 
The distinction derives from the scope of the duty 
owed by the doctor who undertakes the care of a 
newborn infant. The law demands only the provision 
of care that society may reasonably expect, given 
the risk, available means and likelihood of benefit 
. h . 85 in t e circumstances. 
"The law does not demand the unreasonable or 
extraordinary, for few people could live up to 
such a standard, and fewer would try. 1186 
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In the case of the defective infant it i.s often 
di.Hi.cult to determine what are ordinary as opposed 
to extraordinary means. Some would argue that all 
necessary medical care becomes extraordinary in the 
case of infants born wi.th major defects. But this i.s 
based on the conclusion of the doctor as to the 
quality of life that wi.ll be experienced by the infant 
after treatment and has little support i.n law. 
In many cases treatment of a newborn wi.ll entail 
great expense or i.nconveni.ence to the family, and 
pai.n to the infant, but often prolongs life for a 
significant period. There is only lack of reasonable 
hope of benefit if life itself is not seen as a benefit 
for the child, a judgement for which there is little 
legal precedent. Thus it is apparent that where the 
procedure or treatment will substantially prolong the 
life of a defective infant, it must be considered 
ordinary medical care. If the doctor fails to render 
medical care i.n these circumstances then pursuant to 
Section 151 of the Crimes Act 1961 he i.s criminally 
responsible if the infant i.s permanently injured or 
di.es. 
A doctor mi.ght also argue that withholding medical 
care from the infant was necessary to avoid the 
psychological, economic and physical suffering of the 
infant, its family and society, greater harm than 
would ensue from the death of the infant. But it is 
apparent that the doctrine of necessity cannot apply 
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in this situation. In R v. Dudley and Stephens87 , 
the Queen's Bench rejected the defence of necessity 
on a charge of murder, when it was raised by 
two survivors of a shipwreck. To save their own 
lives they had killed a seventeen year old boy 
and ea ten his flesh. The court held that there 
is no unqualified privilege to preserve ones life 
d ' d 88 an sa1 : 
"Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? 
By what measure is the comparative value of 
lives to be measured? Is it to be strength or 
intellect or what? It is plain that the principle 
leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine 
the necessity which will justify him in deliberately 
taking another's life to save his own. In this 
case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting 
was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him 
than any of the grown men?" 
The gravity of harm to be avoided with respect 
to a defective infant clearly does not outweigh 
the harm of killing another human being. The 
harm sought to be avoided is merely the inconvenience 
shame and economic burden of caring for an abnormal 
infant. 
Despite the fact that no doctor has yet been convicted 
of murder or manslaughter for withholding care 
from a defective infant charges have been laid 
on several occasions. In July 1917 Doctor Harry 
] . Haiseldon of Chicago allowed a baby girl born 
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with a microcepha lie head to die when he could 
have saved her life. Forty other doctors had examined 
the child and agreed with Dr Haiseldon 's decision. 
He was acquitted of all charges in Nov"'mber 1917. 89 
More recently in June 1981 the parents and attending 
doctor of siamese twins born in Danville, Illinois 
were charged with conspiracy to commit murder. 
An order that the twins be given no food or water 
-"Do not feed in accordance with parents wishes" 
had been written on their medical chart. The 
case was subsequently dismissed for lack of evidence 
as none of the nurses were willing or able to 
link the parents and doctor directly with the order 
to withhold food. 90 
On June 28, 1980 a woman gave birth to a Down's 
Syndrome infant with no further clinically detectable 
congenital abnormalities. The attending doctor 
was Doctor Leonard Arthur, a senior consultant 
paediatrician. He made a note: "Parents do not 
wish it to survive. Nursing care only", and prescribed 
a morphine-type drug to alleviate distress as and 
when it arose. The infant died sixty-nine hours 
later. On February 2, 1981 Doctor Arthur was charged 
with the murder of the infant. 91 
The prosecution alleged that there was no medical 
justification for administering the drug to the 
baby, and that the purpose of so doing was to 
stop the baby sucking and therefore feeding, restrict 
its breathing, and cause the onset of pneumonia. 
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After ten days of the trial the charge of murder was 
withdrawn from the jury and the charge of attempted 
murder substituted. The prosecution's medical expert 
witness had failed to give sufficient evidence to 
support the murder charge. 92 Farquarson J. summed 
up to the jury with the following statement: 93 
"Certainly, in this country no individual is given 
sole power of life or death over another ... All 
must be alive to the danger of giving too much 
power to anyone, in the medical or other professions 
to exert influence over life and health of the 
public at large ••. Whatever ethics a profession 
might evolve they could not stand on their own or 
survive if they were in conflict with the law •.• I 
imagine you will think long and hard before 
concluding that doctors of the eminence we have 
heard here have evolved standards that amount to 
committing a crime." 
The jury acquitted Doctor Arthur in two hours. 94 
However it cannot be suggested that this verdict 
establishes the legal right of a doctor to withhold 
treatment from an infant and allow it to die. For one 
thing, the jury's decision on the facts of a particular 
case create no legal precedent. Secondly the acquittal 
was in a large measure the result of a bungled 
prosecution and because of the way in which they 
presented their case "non-treatment" was never the 
issue. Furthermore in the subsequent case of McKay v. 
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Essex Health Authority95 Stephenson LJ stated: 96 
"It is still the law that it is unlawful to take 
away the life of a born child or of any living 
person after birth." 
Although a clear basis for prosecution exists, 
no parent or doctor has yet had criminal charges 
laid against them in New Zealand for withholding 
ordinary medical care from a defective infant. 
There are several possible explanations for this. 
Firstly the extremely low visibility of the practice. 
Nobody complains to the police because the parties 
involved agree that the best course of action has 
been taken. Secondly, one might say that the 
prosecuting authorities, through the exercise of 
their discretion, have informally delegated to parents 
and doctors authority to decide the fate of defective 
newborns, 97 because they believe that in some 
cases withholding treatment is a desirable practice. 
If such is the de facto policy of the police in 
New Zealand it is illegitimate because the police 
have a duty to the public to enforce the law. 
In Ex Pa rte Blackburn98 Saloman LJ stated: 99 
"In my judgement the police owe the public a 
clear legal duty to enforce the law a duty 
which I have no doubt they recognise and which 
generally they perform most conscientiously 
and efficiently. In the extremely unlikely event, 
however, of the police failing or refusing to 
carry out their duty, the court would not be 
powerless 
is 
in 
quite 
any 
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to intervene. For example, if' as 
unthinkable, the chief police officer 
district were to issue an instruction 
that as a matter of policy the police would 
take no steps to prosecute any housebreaker, 
I have little doubt but that any householder 
in that district would be able to obtain an 
order of mandamus for the instruction to be 
withdrawn. Of course, the police have a wide 
discretion as to whether or not they will prosecute 
in any particular case. In my judgement, however, 
the action I have postulated would be a clear 
breach of duty. It would be so improper that 
it could not amount to an exercise of discretion." 
Whatever the reasons for lack of prosecutions in 
this area one cannot conclude that doctors will 
be safe in the future. As the practice is more 
openly acknowledged and publicly debated some 
prosecutions will inevitably occur. 
B. Civil 
To argue that it is morally permissible to procure 
the death of a defective infant in certain circumstances 
is not to argue that it is morally wrong not to 
do so. But if it is, the question arises, whether 
a defective infant who is not allowed to die in 
a case in which it was morally permissible to 
allow it to do so could at a later date sue for 
damages from the person responsible for its continued 
existence. A question closely analogous to this 
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one has emerged in the "wrongful life" cases. 
Wrongful life is the label used to describe an 
emerging tort theory in which a child brings a 
cause of action alleging that due to the defendant's 
negligence he was born. The term has been applied 
to two factually distinguishable situations. The 
first is where a healthy child brings a suit against 
his parents because he is dissatisfied with the 
circumstances of his birth, for example, an illegitimate 
child suing his father seeking damages for deprivation 
f h . . h b b 1 . · l OO Th· o 1s rig t to e orn eg1t1mate. 1s type 
of suit has been uniformly rejected. The second 
involves severely handicapped children bringing 
suits against a hospital, doctor or genetic counsellor 
because they have been born defective. 
It is important to distinguish an action for "wrongful 
life" from an action for "wrongful birth" or an 
action for "wrongful pregnancy". An action for 
wrongful birth involves the parents bringing a 
suit against a doctor alleging that his negligence 
was the cause of the child's birth. That is, the 
doctor negligently failed to inform them of the 
possibility that their child would be defective 
and had they known this they would have chosen 
to abort. In an action for wrongful pregnancy 
the parents allege that the doctor's negligence 
was the cause of conception itself, for example, 
where a doctor negligently performs a sterilisation 
. 101 operation. 
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A "wrongful life" action involves a defendant whose 
medical advice leads parents to believe that their 
fetus will be born healthy, resulting in their decision 
not to abort. When the child is subsequently born 
in a defective state, the child as plaintiff claims 
the resulting injury to be his own life which was 
caused by the defendant's lack of due care in 
advising 102 his parents. The plaintiff is not claiming 
that the defects per se are a result of the defendant's 
negligence but that the injury is the birth with 
such defects. 
The tort of wrongful life suggests that quality 
of life is now of grave importance. In some cases, 
where on balance, the quality of life may total 
out in the negative, the concept of wrongful life 
suggests that a decent death should be allowed 
for children for whom the only possibility is protracted 
painful dying. If this concept is accepted it is 
only logical that it be extended to a concept of 
tort for wrongful continuance of existence. 
In the past courts have continually rejected the 
wrongful life cause of action which presents them 
with the question of whether under any circumstances 
a child can claim that his birth is an injury. 
A severely defective child first pursued this cause 
of action in 1967. lOJ The child's mother contracted 
rubella during her pregnancy and was advised 
by her doctor that the rubella would not adversely 
affect the fetus. The child was born severely 
48. 
handicapped and sued the doctor for negligently 
advising his mother. The court denied the cause 
of action on the grounds that it was logically 
impossible to measure the damages because this 
would require a comparison of the child's present 
condition with that of non-existence. 
In the following year a "wrongful life" action 
was again denied to a defective child on the grounds 
that ( 1) since birth with defects was better than 
non-existence the child had suffered no harm, 
and ( 2) to allow the cause of action would be 
to approve abortion. 104 The court stated: 105 
"A plaintiff has no rem~c.y against a defendant 
whose offence is that he failed to consign the 
plaintiff to oblivion. Such a cause of action 
is alien to our system of jurisprudence. 
More recently in December 1977 the court in Park 
v. Chessin 
106 
decided that the infant plaintiff had 
stated a cause of action and was entitled to damages. 
The court threw aside major arguments against 
the judicial recognition of the theory of wrongful 
life without addressing them. Instead, in its relatively 
brief rationale, the court stated that inherent 
in the abortion legislation is a public policy 
consideration that gives potential parents the right 
not to have a child. The breach of that right 
was said to be tortious to the fundamental right 
of a child to be born as a whole functional human 
being. However the case was reversed within a 
49, 
year. The appeal court held that public policy 
precluded the granting of the wrongful life cause 
of action. That because society placed a high 
value on life to declare any life to be a harm, 
regardless of the degree of deformity, would be 
to circumvent that belief. They also expressed 
concern that the line of recovery could not be 
reasonably drawn. 
However in 1980 the California Court of Appeal 
in Curlender v . Bio-Science Laboratories107 in a 
decision based mainly on public policy allowed 
a cause of action in wrongful life to a severely 
defective child. The plaintiff child was born with 
Tay-Sachs disease, suffered severe mental retardation, 
gross physical deformity and had a life expectancy 
of four years. Genetic testing to determine whether 
either of the parents were the carrier of the disease 
was performed negligently and revealed a negative 
result. The child claimed that her mother would 
have chosen to abort the pregnancy had the test 
correctly shown her parents to be carriers of the 
disease. 
The court rejected the reasoning of previous cases 
and allowed the wrongful life action in cases where 
the genetic test is capable of disclosing a high 
probability that a severely impaired child would 
result and that due to the defendant's negligence 
a severely handicapped child does result, on the 
following grounds: 
so. 
1. Public policy dictated the need for a wrongful 
life action. Four factors contribute to this: lOB 
(a) abortion being legal, the medical profession 
have a duty to provide parents-to-be with 
an opportunity to decide whether to abort, 
based on accurate information; 
(b) a need to ease the national health care 
burden; 
(c) the need to protect the public from the 
medical profession's negligence would 
be accomplished by the deterrent effect 
of litigation; 
( d) the need to provide a remedy where 
a substantial number of plaintiffs were 
claiming injury. "Fundamental in our 
jurisprudence is the principal that for 
every wrong there is a remedy and that 
an injured party should be compensated 
for all damage 
109 the wrong-doer". 
proximately caused by 
2. Defective birth itself is an injury. "The reality ... 
is that such a plain tiff both exists and suffers 
due to the negligence of others ••. We need 
not be concerned with the fact that had the 
defendant 
might not 
not 
have 
been 
come 
negligent the 
into existence at 
plaintiff 
all. ,,llO 
The court thereby rejected the argument that 
no injury had been suffered since existence 
with defects was better than non-existence. 
3. 
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The court rejected the argument that 
measure the child's it was impossible to 
damages because this would involve 
a comparison between his present condition 
and non-existence. It set forth the measure 
111 of damages as follows: 
"[We] construe the wrongful 
right of 
life cause 
of action ... as the such child 
to recover 
suffering 
damages for the 
to be endured 
pain 
during 
and 
the 
limited 
child 
loss 
life 
and 
span 
any 
resulting 
condition." 
available 
special 
from the 
to such 
pecuniary 
impaired 
The scope of liability under the Curlender 
decision is uncertain. The court did 
not 
to 
is 
specify the degree of defect 
recover damages. The only 
that the child involved in 
was described as "severely" 
necessary 
guideline 
that case 
defective. 
However if courts in the future continue 
to rely on the public policy grounds 
given in Curlender for allowing such 
a cause of action the scope of liability 
must be extended. 
II If the public requires a recourse 
to negligent genetic counselling and 
the proper role of the judicial system 
is to deter future neg 1 igence, the 
extent of deformity should not affect 
recovery. Whether one child is born 
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missing only 
is missing 
a 
his 
finger 
eyesight, 
and 
it 
another 
matters 
not if deterrence and social protection 
is the ultimate goal that is to be 
reached. 11112 
In contrast the Court of Appeal in McKay v. Essex ll3 
the first reported authority in England, held recently 
that the common law did not recognise that a defective 
child had a cause of action for wrongful life. 
The claim arose from the fact that the plaintiff 
child was born disabled by rubella which infected 
the mother in the early months of her pregnancy. 
The plaintiff alleged that the Essex Health Authorities 
Laboratory was negligent in testing the mother's 
blood samples with the result that she was misled 
as to the advisability of an abortion, and that 
the doctor was negligent in failing to advise the 
mother of the desirability of an abortion. 
The Court of Appeal discussed the many American 
cases including Curlender, but dismissed the latter 
as not providing "any answer to the reasoned 
objections to this cause of action". 114 They held: 
1. That the only duty owed to the unborn child 
by the defendants was a duty not to injure 
her and this duty had not bee;-, breached. 
To say that the defendants were negligent 
1n allowing her, injured as she was to be 
born was to say that they had a duty to 
procure her abortion. The court stated: 115 
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"There is no doubt that this child could 
legally have been deprived of life by the 
mother's undergoing an abortion with the 
doctor's advice and help. So the law 
recognises a difference between the life of 
a fetus and the life of those who have 
been born. But, because a doctor can 
lawfully by statute do to a fetus what he 
cannot lawfully do to a person who has 
been born, it does not follow that he is 
under a legal obligation to a fetus to do 
it and terminate its life, or that the fetus 
has a legal right to die ... To impose such 
a duty towards the child would ..• make a 
further inroad on the sanctity of human 
life which would be contrary to public 
policy. It would mean regarding the life 
of a handicapped child as not only less 
valuable than the life of a normal child, 
but so much less valuable that it was not 
worth preserving ... " 
2. " ... If difficulty in assessing damages is a bad 
reason for refusing the task, impossibility of 
. h . d .,116 assessing t em 1s a goo one. 
The Court of Appeal also referred to the Congenital 
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 which was 
enacted in July 1976. This effectively deprives 
the child of a right of action for wrongful life 
and imports the assumption that, the child would 
0.W [18~/\RY 
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have been born normal and healthy (not 
that it would not have been born at 
all).117 
The possibility that such a cause of action will 
be recognised by the courts of New Zealand in 
the future is remote. The English Court of Appeal's 
decisive decision in the McKay case would be very 
persuasive in New Zealand. It must also be emphasised 
that the Curlender decision is the only case in 
which recognition has been granted to the defective 
infant's right not to be born. 
Nevertheless 
would be 
assuming 
recognised 
that a 
in New 
wrongful 
Zealand 
life 
are 
claim 
there 
any logical reasons for denying 
cases of defective infants claiming 
its extension to 
that they should 
have been allowed to die at birth. Such an infant 
would first have to establish that the doctor owed 
a duty to it to allow it to die or in other words 
that the infant had a right to be allowed to die. 
Clearly such a right cannot exist at the present 
time in New Zealand because allowing an infant 
to die by withholding medical treatment can attract 
the sanctions of the criminal law. On the other 
hand it is equally clear that in certain cases of 
infants with severe disabilities it is morally and 
ethically permissible for a doctor to withhold medic a 1 
treatment. If the criminal law was brought into 
line with current medical ethics and practice, 
as proposed later in this paper, then this objection 
55. 
no longer exists. 
have a right to die? 
Would a defective infant then 
In America such a right has been recognised by 
courts in respect of incompetent adult patients. 
In the Saikewicz 
118 
case the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court upheld the decision of the state institution 
to withhold chemotheraphy treatment from a sixty-seven 
year old patient with a mental age of approximately 
two and a half years. 
stated: 
119 
In so holding the court 
"It is clear that the most significant of the 
asserted State interests is that of preservation 
of human life. Recognition of such an interest, 
however, does not necessarily resolve the problem 
where the .:>tfliction or disease clearly indicates 
that life will soon, and inevitably, be extinguished. 
The interest of the State in prolonging a life 
must be reconciled with the interest of the 
individual to reject the traumatic cost of 
prolongation. There is a substantial distinction 
in the State's insistence that the human life 
be saved where the affliction is curable, as 
opposed to the State interest where, as here, 
the issue it not whether but when, for how 
long, and at what cost to the individual that 
1 ife may be briefly extended." 
Simi la rly, in In re Quinlan the court stated: 
120 
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"We think that the State's interest contra weakens 
and the individual's right of privacy grows as 
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the 
prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at 
which the individual's rights overcome the State 
interest" 
However the difficulty with defective newborns is that 
although the "bodily invasion" required to preserve 
life is great, the prognosis is good, in the sense 
that the infant's life expectancy will be good 
although they will often experience severe mental 
and physical handicaps. The Court in Saikewicz 
rejected the view that quality of life should be 
a factor in the decision, but this is not the view 
taken by England courts. In Re B (A Minor) Templeman 
J said obiter: 
121 
In 
LJ 
"There may be cases, I know not, of severe 
prolonged damage where the future is so certain 
and where the life of the · child is so bound 
to be full of pa in and suffering that the court 
might be driven to a different conclusion." 
McKay v. Essex Health Authority, Stephenson 
commented on Re B: 122 
"Like this Court when it had to consider the 
interests of a child born with Down's Syndrome 
in Re B (A Minor), I would not answer until 
it is necessary to do so the question whether 
the life of a child could be so certainly 'awful' 
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and 'intolerable' that it would be in its best 
interests to end it and it might be considered 
that it had a right to be put to death." 
It is apparent from the above two extracts that the 
courts do not completely dismiss the notion that an 
infant might have the right to die. 
Assume then that New Zealand courts will recognise 
the wrongful life action, that in cert a in circumstances 
an infant has a right to die and that it is not a 
crime for a doctor to withhold treatment from that 
particular infant. A doctor who continues to deliver 
life sustaining treatment to that infant may be liable 
to that infant for damages in tort. This is not a 
very likely scenario considering the strong policy 
reasons behind the England Court of Appeal's 
rejection of the wrongful life ea use of action in 
McKay's case, but a possibility nevertheless. 
A question would then arise, peculiar to the New 
Zealand context of whether such an action would be 
barred by Section 28( 1) of the Accident Compensation 
Act 1982. This section provides that: 
" ... where any person suffers personal injury by 
accident in New Zealand or dies as a result of 
personal injury so suffered ... no proceedings for 
damages arising directly or indirectly out of the 
injury or death shall be brought in any Court in 
New Zealand independently of this Act, whether 
by that person or any other person, and whether 
under any rule of law or any enactment." 
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Personal injury by accident is defined in Section 
2 of the Act to include "medical misadventure". 
The meaning of the phrase has been considered 
in various cases, both by the corporation and 
the Courts. In L v.M123 Cooke J said obiter: 124 
"The 1974 amendment has made various additions 
to the definition of personal injury by accident. 
In particular the phrase now includes "medical 
misadventure". I think there was a medical 
misadventure here. It is arguable that under 
the new definition this would be enough to 
bring Section 5 ( 1) into play - that it is 
unnecessary to show as well anything that 
would ordinarily be called a personal injury." 
Thus it would seem that although the 'injury' 
complained of in the case of a defective newborn 
life itself does not come within the ordinary meaning 
of the words "personal injury", this is no bar 
to it being considered a "personal injury by accident" 
within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. Despite 
this the case of a defective infant would not fall 
within the term medical misadventure. It was defined 
by the Accident Compensation Appeal Authority 
. l d' 125 as 1nc u 1ng: 
"a mischance or accident, unexpected and under-
signed, relating to medical treatment. .. " 
This definition has been approved by the High 
Court in Accident Compensation Commission v. Auckland 
Hospital Board & M
1
~
6 
There is no mischance or 
accident in the decision by a doctor to treat a 
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defective newborn infant. It is part of his duty as a 
doctor to preserve life. The Act does not provide a 
guarantee of complete success in medical treatment. 
Where there is an unsatisfactory outcome of treatment 
which can be classified as merely within the normal 
range of medical or surgical failure, this would not 
be held to be a medical misadventure. 127 
Consequently the Accident Compensation Act would 
afford no protection to a doctor from a potential tort 
action for wrongful continuance of life. However if 
a doctor withholds treatment from a defective infant 
because in his or her judgement the infant's life 
would not be worth living, and the infant continues 
to live in a more impaired state than it would have 
had it received treatment immediately after birth, 
any tort action for damages would be barred by 
Section 27 ( 1) of the Act. The decision to withhold 
treatment resulting in further injury to the infant 
falls clearly within the term "medical misadventure" 
the injury being an unexpected result of the medical 
deicision. Death was the expected result. 
If, however, a non-treatment decision is made by a 
doctor without the consent of the parents and the 
infant dies the parents might sue the doctor for 
negligence, wrongfu 1 death, abandonment, or breach 
of an implied contract to do whatever is necessary to 
sustain life. 128 It is clear that in these circumstances 
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the Accident Compensation 
protection 
in these 
for the doctor. 
circumstances is 
Act 
The 
the 
would provide no 
death of the infant 
expected result of 
a medical decision and thus not a personal injury 
by accident. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of possibilities 
for civil liability of doctors in infant euthanasia 
cases but illustrates that those doctors who participate 
in "no treatment" decisions incur the risk of civil, 
as well as criminal, liability. 
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5. A PROPOSAL FOR LAW REFORM 
It is apparent that doctors who participate in 
the practice of withholding treatment from defective 
newborns may be guilty of crimes ranging from 
conspiracy, to murder, and tortiously liable for 
damages in some cases for the consequences of 
their decisions. Should doctors continue to carry 
risks of criminal and civil liability for decisions 
to withhold treatment which are generally thought 
to be morally and ethically permissible? 
According to Burt 129 the answer is yes even though 
the position may seem hypocritical. He states that 
this double standard is necessary to protect us 
all and quotes in support a passage from Lord 
Coleridge in R v. Dudley and Stephens: 130 -
"It must not be supposed that in refusing to 
admit temptation to be an excuse for crime 
it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; 
how awful the suffering; how hard in such 
trials to keep the judgement straight and the 
conduct pure. We a re often compelled to set 
up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and 
to lay down rules which we could not ourselves 
satisfy." 
He goes on to argue that if there is a socially 
sanctioned mechanism for ending the lives of deformed 
infants the question will insistently be posed for 
every deformed child and his parents: why have 
you inflicted this monstrosity on our community?
131 
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But this is no justification for the current situation 
in which doctors are forced to act with great 
uncertainty about their ultimate legal safety. As 
Duff and Campbell argue 
" ... if working out these dilemmas in ways we 
suggest is a violation of the law ... the law 
should be changed. 11132 
I would propose that the Crimes Act 1961 be amended 
to sanction the current practice of doctors with 
respect to defective newborns and that a new statute 
be introduced to establish procedures for the review 
of parental and medical decisions regarding the 
treatment of defective newborns. 
Section 151 of the Crimes Act should be amended 
by the addition of 
the following form: 
subsections (3) and (4) in 
(3) No one is under a legal duty to provide the 
the necessaries of life to a severely defective 
infant under his charge unless requested to 
do so by the parents or guardians of the 
infant. 
( 4) A severely defective infant is one who cannot 
survive infancy without medical intervention 
and whose prognosis for cognitive sapient 
life, even assuming this intervention, is poor. 
A new statute should be passed along the following lines: 
133 
Section 1 A 
who 
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severely 
is not 
defective 
likely 
newborn is one 
to survive infancy 
without medical intervention and whose 
prognosis for cognitive sapient life, 
even assuming this intervention, is poor. 
Section 2 ( 1) 
( 2) 
In all cases where a 
in 
severely 
defective newborn is need of 
life-prolonging medical treatment 
guardians the parents or and 
of such child refuse to consent 
to that treatment, if the attending 
doctor concurs with the parents 
or guardians decision then, subject 
to subsection (2) of this section, 
such treatment shall be admb :~tered. 
If any member of the medical 
staff involved with the care of 
the child disagrees with the decision 
of the 
refuse 
parents 
treatment, 
or 
he 
guardian 
may 
to 
refer 
the matter to the Medical Treatment 
Panel for hearing. 
Section 3 In all cases where a severely defective 
newborn 
treatment 
is 
and 
in need of 
the parents 
life-prolonging 
or guardian 
of such child refuse to consent to that 
treatment, if the attending doctor favours 
treatment, then the matter shall be referred 
to the Medical Treatment Panel for hearing. 
Section 4 ( 1) All cases referred to the Panel 
shall be set down for an immediate 
hearing. 
( 2) 
( 3) 
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In all cases the panel shall 
appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of the 
child. 
The Panel shall order treatment 
to be withheld if it can be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence 
that such withholding of treatment 
is in the child IS best interests, 
considering the probability of 
recovery with the proposed treatment, 
the potential side effects of the 
treatment, 
treatment. 
and the nature of the 
(4) A majority vote of the Panel shall 
be sufficient on which to base 
findings and an order. 
Section 5 Any party to the Panel hearing may, 
within two days after the date of an 
order made by the panel, appeal on 
grounds of law to the High Court. 
Section 6 In all cases where a severely defective 
Section 7 
is in need of newborn 
treatment and 
child 
the parents 
life-prolonging 
or guardian 
of 
the 
the 
No 
to 
an 
be 
such 
attending 
treatment. 
request 
doctor 
the 
must 
treatment, 
administer 
person who makes a decision in relation 
the treatment or non-treatment of 
infant pursuant to this Act shall 
liable in tort for damages for the 
consequences of that decision. 
Section 8 ( 1 ) Every hospital board shall establish 
a Medical Treatment Panel which 
shall consist of five members: 
(a) one pediatrician ; 
( b) one other registered medical 
practitioner ; 
( C) one lawyer ; 
( d) two members of the public 
who are not lawyers and 
who, at the time of their 
appointment, are not engaged 
in or licenced to practice 
medicine. 
( 2) No person may serve on a Panel 
if the person has a professional 
or personal interest in a case 
under consideration. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Modern medical science has given us the power to 
preserve and sustain the lives of seriously defective 
newborns. This power inevitably includes the power 
to deny life. Doctors currently involved in these life 
or death decisions, which . are ethically and morally 
acceptable within the medical 
sanctions and civil liability. 
reform contained in Part 5 
profession, risk criminal 
The proposal for law 
of this paper is an 
attempt to remedy this situation while still preserving 
some protection for the rights of the infant. 
The suggested amendment to the Crimes Acts would 
relieve doctors of the fear of possible murder or 
manslaughter charges by removing their duty to 
provide the necessaries of life for a severely defective 
infant unless requested to do so by the parents. 
Whereas the proposed statute gives the parents of the 
infant the prime responsibility in the decision. The 
infant's interests are adequately safeguarded by a 
mandatory referral to a panel consisting of two 
doctors, a lawyer and two members of the public, in 
any case in which the attending doctor or any other 
medical person involved with the care of the infant, 
does not agree with the parents decision to withhold 
treatment. The appointment of a guardian ad litem to 
represent solely the interests of the infant is a 
further protection of the infant's rights. 
67. 
These proposals to reform the law will not solve 
the problems of parents and doctors who must decide 
the fate of a newborn infant. Until medical science 
can prevent or cure spina bifida, Down's 
and other debilitating diseases, these 
ethical questions will remain. They do, 
Syndrome 
difficult 
however, 
bring the criminal law into step with current practice 
and provide a procedure, including protections 
for the interests of the child, for reaching the 
final decision. 
68. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 R.C. Coburn "Morality and the Defective Newborn" 
(1980) 4 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 340. 
2 Idem. 
3 Idem. 
4 Idem. 
5 Idem. 
6 N. St John-Stevas Life Death and the Law (Eyre and 
Spoltswoode London, 1961) 264. 
7 O.R. Russell Freedom to Die. Moral and Legal Aspects 
of Euthanasia (Human Sciences Press, New York, 
1975) 53. 
8 Idem. 
9 Supra n.7, 59. 
10 Supra n.7, 65. 
11 Idem. 
12 Supra n. 7, 239. 
13 "Ethical Issues in Pcdiatric Surgery: A National 
Survey of Pediatricia11s and Pediatric Surgeons" 0977) 
60 Pediatricis 588, 599. 
14 Ibid 589. 
15 H. B. Eckstein "Severely \1alformecl Children" 1973, 
2 British Medical Journal 284. 
16 Idem. 
17 J. Rachels "Active and Passive Euthanasia" (1975) 
292 New England Journal of Medicine 78. 
18 Ibid 79. 
19 T. L. Beauchamp "A Reply to Rachels on Active and 
Passive Euthanasia" in T.L. Beauchamp and S. Perlin 
(eds) Ethical Issues in Death and Dying (Prentice-Hall 
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1978) 246, 247. 
20 Ibid 250. 
21 A. Shaw "Doctor Do we have a Choice?" The New 
York Times Magazine, 30 January 1972, 51. 
69 . 
22 R.E. Cooke "Whose suffering?" (1972) 80 Journal of 
Pediatrics 906. 
23 J. 1v1. Freeman "The Shortsighted Treatment of 
Myelomeningocele: A Long term Case Report" (1974) 
53 Pedia tries 311. 
24 Idem. 
25 Supra n .17. 
26 Supra n.19, 252. 
2 7 P • Foot " E u t h a n a s i a " i n E . 1 d.' u 11 en ( e d ) De a t h a n d 
Decision (Westfield Press, Colorado, 1978) 106. 
28 Supra n.19, 252. 
29 Ibid 253. 
30 A.R. Jonsen and .~.J. Garland "A Moral Policy for 
Life/Death Decisions in the Intensive Care Nursey" 
in A. R. Jonsen and \LJ. Garland (eds) Ethics of 
\few~orn Intensive Care (Institute of \JOVernmental 
Studies, Berkeley, 1976) 142. 
31 "Ethics of Selective Treatment of Soina Bifida" Report 
by a Working Party, 1975, 1, The Lancet 85. 
32 W.G. Bartholome. Letter to the Editor (1981) 68 Pediatrics 
910. 
33 R.A. McCormick "To Save or Let Die: Tl-ie Dilemma 
of Modern Medicine" in R.F. Weir ( ed) Ethica 1 Issues 
in Death and Dying (New York Col um bid University 
Press, New York, 1977) 173, 175. 
34 L.S. Rothenberg "Demands for Life and Requests for 
Death" in E. McMullan (eel) Death and Decision (Westfield 
Press, Colorado, 1978) 142. 
35 Supra n.31, 86. 
36 Supra n.30, 145. 
37 Idem. 
38 E. Slater "Health Service or Sickness Service?" 1971, 
4, British Medical Journal 734, 735. 
39 R.B. Zachary "Life With Spina Bifida" 1977, 2, British 
Medical Journal 1460, 1462. 
70. 
40 A. V. Campbell Moral Dilemmas in Medicine (2 ed, 
Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1975) 110. 
41 J .A. Robertson "Discretionary Non-Treatment of Defective 
Newborns" in A. Milunsky and G.J. Annas (eds) Genetics 
and the Law (Plenum Press, New York, 1976) 451, 
456. 
42 R.S. Duff "Counselling Families and Deciding Care 
of Severely Defective Children: A Way of Coping with 
'Medical Vietnam' " (1981) 67 Pediatrics 315, 316. . 
43 C.P. Harrison "\ledici ne, Terminal Illness and the 
Law" 0977) 117 Canadian Medica 1 Association Journa 1 
514, 516. 
44 E.F. Diamond, Letter to the Editor. (1981) 68 Pediatrics 
909 . 
45 Supra n.30, 146. 
46 Supra n.40, 457. 
47 t\1. Dixon "Nature's Sounder Judge'11ent" (1981) 94 
Midwives Croniclc and Nursing Notes 353. 
48 J.A. Robertson "Dilemma rn Danville" (1981) 11 Hastings 
Centre Report 5, 8. 
49 ] .A. Robertson "The Courts and Non Trea trnent Criteria" 
in C. B. Wong and ] . p. Swazey (eds) Dilemmas of 
Dying: Policies and Procedures for Decisions Not 
to Treat (G. f(. Hall, ledical Pub1 is hers, 1981) 103. 
50 Idem. 
51 In re Quinlan 70 NJ 10; 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
52 Superintendent of Bclchertown v. Sa ikewicz 373 Mass. 
728; 370 N.E. 2d 417 (1977). 
53 In re Dinnerstein 6 1fass. App. Ct. 466; 380 N.E. 
2d 134 0978) 
54 A.G.M. Campbell and R.S. Duff "Authors Response 
to Richard Sherlock's Commentary" (1979) 5 Journal 
of Medica 1 Ethics 141. 
55 Supra n . 13. 
56 Supra n.33, 182. 
57 Supra n.42, 318. 
71. 
58 N. Fost "Counselling Families Who Have a Child with 
a Severe Congenital Anomoly" ( 1981) 67 Pediatrics 
321, 322. 
59 R. Sherlock "Selective Non-Treatment of Newborns" 
(1979) 5 Journal of Medical Ethics 139, 
60 Supra n . 4 2 , 31 f'.; • 
61 Children and Young Persons Act 1974. 
62 Supra n. 42, 319, 
63 H. Beynon "Doctors as Murderers" 1982 Criminal Law 
Review 17. 
64 Maine \-1edical Centre v. Houle. Unreported, Superior 
Court of the State of daine, 14 February 1974. 
65 Idem; In Re B. (A Minor) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
66 Section 159 ( 1) Crimes Act 1961. 
67 Section 160(4) Crimes Act 1961. 
68 Section 160( 2) ( b) Crimes Act 1961. 
69 Section 162(1) Crimes Act 1961. 
70 Section 167 (a) Crimes Act 1961. 
71 Section 171 Crimes Act 1961. 
72 Section 151 (2) Crimes Act 1961. 
73 Ybarra v. Spangard 25 Cal (2d) 486, 154 P. 2d 687 
(1944). 
74 An additional onus of care is imposed on the parents 
by Section 152(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 which reads: 
"Everyone who as a oarent or person in place 
of a parent is under a 
necessaries for any child 
legal 
under 
duty to provide 
the a~e of 16 
years, being a child in his actual custody, is 
criminally responsible for omitting without lawful 
excuse to do so, whether the child is helpless 
or not, if the death of the child is caused, or 
if his life is endangered or his health permanently 
injured, by such omission." 
75 (1903) 6 OLR 132, 
76 Ibid 136. 
72. 
77 R V. Elder [1925] 2 WWR 545; R V. Burney [1958] 
NZLR 745. 
78 Section 151(1) Crimes Act 1961. 
79 [ 1955] AC 93. 
80 Supran.77, 753. 
81 Supra n. 75. 
82 Ibid 138. 
83 ] . 0' Sullivan Law for Nurses ( 3rd ed., The Law 
Book Co. Ltd., 1983) 243. 
84 Supra n.51. 
85 J .A. Robertson "Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective 
Newborns. A Legal Analysis" 0974/75) 27 Standford 
Law Review 213, 235. 
86 Ibid 236. 
87 (1884) 14 QBD 273. 
88 Ibid 287. 
89 Supra n.7, 63. 
90 
91 
Supra n.48, 5. 
D. Brahams "Aquittal of Paediatrician 
Death of Infant with Down Syndrome" 
Lancet 1101. 
charged after 
1981, 2 The 
92 E. Bailey "The Trial of Dr Arthur" (1982) 3 Nursing 
Focus 183. 
93 Supra n. 91. 
94 [dem. 
95 [1982] 2All ER 771 (C.A.). 
96 Ibid 780. 
97 Supra n.85, 243. 
98 R v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex 
Parte Blackburn [1968] 2 WLR 893 (CA). 
99 Ibid 905. 
100 Zepeda v Zepeda 190 NE 2d 848 (1963) 
73. 
101 P. Ledvina "Cur lender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: 
A Rational Step Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful 
Life" 1981 34 Oklahoma Law Review 614, 615. 
102 K. N. Greenfield "Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories: 
California Grants a Course of Action in Wrongful 
Life to the Severely Defective Infant Plaintiff" (1981/82) 
18 California Western Law Review 270, 271. 
103 Gleitman v. Cosgrove 49 NJ 22, 227 A2d 689 (1967). 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital 296 NYS 2d 
41 (1968). 
Ibid 46. 
400 NYS 2d 110 (1977), rev'd 386 NE 2d 807 (1978). 
165 Cal Rptr 477 (1980), disapproved in Turpin v. 
Sortini 31 Cal Rptr 337 ( 1982) as to recovery of general 
damages for being born impaired as opposed to not 
being born at all. Held the child may recover special 
damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary 
to treat the child's hereditary ailment. 
Supra n.102, 279. 
Supra n.107, 489. 
Ibid 488. 
Ibid 489. 
Supra n .102, 287. 
Supra n.95. 
Ibid 783. 
Ibid 781. 
Ibid 782. 
Ibid 779. 
Supra n.52. 
Ibid 425. 
Supra n.51. 
(1981) 1 WLR 1421, 1424. 
Supra n.95, 781. 
(1979) 2 NZLR 519 (CA). 
74. 
124 Ibid 530. 
125 Appeal by S. Collier ( 1976) 1 NZAR 130. 
126 [1980] 2 NZLR 748; [1981] NZACR 9. 
127 Practice note [ 1981] NZACR 244. 
128 R.S. Ellis "Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?" 
( 1982) 7 American Journal of Law and Medicine 393, 
411. 
129 R. A. Burt "Authorising Death for Anomolous Newborns" 
in A. Milunsky and G.J. Annas (eds) Genetics and 
the Law (Plenum Press, New York, 1976). 
130 I bid 438. 
131 I bid 442. 
132 R.S. Duff and A.G.M. Campbell "Moral and Ethical 
Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery" 0973) 289 
New England Journal of Medicine 890, 894. 
133 Modelled on a statute proposed by R.S. Shapiro in 
"Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer 
to the 'Baby Doe' Dilemma" ( 1983) 20 Harvard Journal 
of Legislation 137. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
• 
-
LAW L,b ~AhY 
f""~~T" ·q-;-r-~ .. ,--- -,. -V.-+--
l r:: .... ~./"~~:~: ::::~r·...:.·:.~ :if 
1ii1i!~"iliH1~i~lr i1i ijif I 1 
3 7212 00443019 3 


